In recent years, concentrate supplementation in milk production has increased worldwide with negative eects on the environment and food security. To counteract this trend, Switzerland introduced an agri-environmental program to support grassland-based milk production in 2014. This paper combines ex-post and ex-ante methods to evaluate short-and long-run eects of this policy on environmental and economic outcomes and to evaluate the policy's contribution to food security. We nd that the policy has no eect on environmental outcomes like ecological area and N surplus but substantial eects on economic outcomes like milk yield per cow and farm income. Furthermore, the program aects food security positively.
Introduction
After the deregulation of milk production in Switzerland, milk producers have strongly increased the proportion of concentrates they feed in order to raise productivity (Erdin and Giuliani 2011) and stay competitive in markets. This has unintended negative eects on the environment and on the supply and distribution of food (i.e., food security).
Milk markets fail to internalize negative externalities on the environment. The increase in concentrate feed use has led a growing number of farmers worldwide to intensify, abandon or convert grassland to arable land (Huyghe et al. 2010 ). This has negative eects on the value of grassland for society as a whole (Peeters 2009 , Huyghe et al. 2010 , as well as on the ecosystem functions of grassland (e.g., carbon sequestration and soil protection), in particular biodiversity (Dahms et al. 2008) . Several papers argue that environmental sustainability of milk production deteriorates if high milk performance goes hand in hand with high concentrate supplementation (Cederberg and Mattsson 2000 , Soder and Rotz 2001 , Thomassen et al. 2008 , Arsenault et al. 2011 , Mack et al. 2009 , Stott and Gourley 2016 .
Providing a growing (world) population with food of sucient quantity and quality while simultaneously safeguarding the world's natural ecosystems includes a reduction in the use of food-competing feed components in livestock rations (Schader et al. 2015 , Erb et al. 2012 . The increased use of concentrate feed requires resources, like cereals and maize, that could otherwise be used for human consumption. Such an allocation, while possibly ecient from an economic perspective, raises moral and ethical issues regarding (global) food security in the face of a growing (world) population.
Against the backdrop of unintended negative eects on the environment and ethical issues regarding food security, Switzerland has introduced the rst voluntary grassland-based milk and meat (GMF) program in Europe. 1 Introduced in 2014, the GMF program discourages the use of concentrate supplementation in milk production through feeding restrictions for grass, maize, and concentrates. Farmers participating in the program receive a payment of CHF 200 per ha of grassland in compensation for lower milk yields.
In this paper, we combine ex-post and ex-ante analysis to evaluate short-and long-run eects of the GMF program on the economic and environmental performance of Swiss dairy farms. Because the program was introduced recently, in 2014, ex-post analysis can only yield insights into its short-run eects. We estimate the causal short-run eects using a dierence-in-dierences (DiD) model based on FADN panel data from 2011 to 2015. To assess the long-run eects, we use ex-ante analysis based on the agent-based sector model SWISSland (Möhring et al. 2016 ).
The main contribution of this paper is to combine ex-post with ex-ante analysis to assess short-and long-run eects of policy measures. On the one hand, there is a literature on ex-post policy evaluation using empirical methods like DiD, xed-eects models or instrumental variables (e.g., Petrick and Zier 2010 , Sielawa and Helfand 2015 , Liu and Henningsen 2016 . On the other hand, there is a literature on ex-ante policy evaluation using (computational) simulation models (e.g., Deppermann et al. 2014, Cortignani and Severini 2012) . However, the two strands of literature are usually independent. Our paper complements a small literature combining ex-ante and ex-post analysis in policy evaluation. For example, Finger et al. (2017) combine econometric time-series models with the static partial equilibrium model CAPRI to analyze the eects of reducing the processing aid for cheese in Switzerland. In contrast, we use causal inference (i.e., DiD) combined with the recursive-dynamic agent-based sector model SWISSland to evaluate economic and environmental eects of an agri-environmental program. Furthermore, this study closes a gap in the evaluation of dierent policy instruments supporting grassland-based milk production. Thus, we can also discuss the eects of direct payments for grassland conditional on environmental regulations compared to the eects of market-based policy measures like concentrate taxes (Hecht et al. 2014) , or (unconditional) area payments (Deppermann et al. 2014 . Finally, our analysis could be of special interest to policy makers in the European Union since the recent abolishment of milk quotas may have similar eects on concentrate supplementation in EU dairy production. Since the GMF program is the rst of its kind in Europe, conclusions drawn from our study are potentially interesting for policy makers in the EU but also other countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the dairy sector in Switzerland, and describes the GMF program in detail. Section 3 describes the ex-post and ex-ante methods. In Section 4, we discuss and compare the results for the short-and long-run analysis at farm and sector level. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Swiss dairy sector and the GMF program Dairy production represents the most important production branch in Swiss agriculture. In 2015, approximately 583,000 dairy cows on 28,600 small-sized family farms produced more than 4 million tons of milk. Because of the climatic and topographic conditions, about two thirds of the agricultural area in Switzerland can only be used for grassland, not to mention the almost 500,000 ha of alpine summering pastures. In particular, the areas north of the Swiss Alps are ideal grassland areas with adequate temperature and rainfall which result in a high per-hectare pasture productivity (Thomet et al. 2011) . Even though the level of concentrate supplementation in Swiss dairy production is less than half of that in Germany, France or the Netherlands (Schweizer Bauer 2014), trends are similar. From 1990 to 2009, concentrate supplementation increased on average by 23 kg per cow per year whereas milk yield increased on average by 100 kg per cow per year (Erdin and Giuliani 2011) . In the last 15 years, taris on concentrate feed imports fell, which led to higher imports of concentrate feed for ruminants and to a decline in fodder crop area in Switzerland, having negative impacts on the environmental performance of Swiss dairy production (Agrofutura 2011 , Sutter et al. 2013 .
Against this background, the Swiss government introduced the grassland-based milk and meat (GMF) program in 2014. The program's goal is to promote animal production systems based on grassland that are characterized by low concentrate and maize supplementation (Bundesrat 2012) . The program pays annually CHF 200 per ha of grassland to farmers if the proportions of concentrates and maize they use in total feed for all ruminants are lower than 10 percent and 25 percent respectively throughout the year. More precisely, the proportion of maize in total feed for ruminants must not exceed 25 percent for farms located in the lowlands, and 15 percent for farms located in the mountains. To receive payments, farms must fulll all feeding restrictions. It does not matter where grass feed is produced, e.g., on the farmer's own farm, on any farm in Switzerland, or abroad. To be eligible for the program, farmers must declare their dry matter intake regarding concentrates, grass and maize for all ruminants. Each year, farmers enter the number and type of livestock, the quantity of concentrates and roughage purchased, and the amount of land and its use into an application form provided by the Swiss Federal Extension Centre (Agridea 2015) . Based on these gures, proportions of concentrate, grass and maize in total feed are calculated.
Methods
This section describes in detail the methods used to assess both short-and long-run eects of the GMF program.
3.1
Short-run analysis: empirical methods
The goal of the empirical part is to estimate the causal short-run eect of the GMF program on various outcomes described below.
Data
We use FADN data of 736 Swiss dairy farms observed over the period 2011 to 2015 (Hoop and Schmid 2014) . The Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) is the institution responsible for summarizing and analyzing data from farm accountancy departments and supplementary surveys of various data processors for research, education, consultation, determination of the economic status of agriculture, agricultural-policy decision-making and evaluation, as well as agricultural valuation, including valuation for tax purposes. Our panel contains farm-level data on concentrate feed (percent), maize feed (percent), grass feed (percent), milk yield per cow (kg), ecological area (percent), and farm income (CHF), as well as area (ha), number of ruminants (livestock units), milk price (CHF/kg), direct payments without GMF payments (CHF), location (valley, hill, mountain), farm type (crop, animal, combined), age and education of farmers. Proportions of concentrate, maize, and grass feed in total feed are computed based on FADN data and the specications provided in the application form collected by the Swiss Federal Extension Centre (Agridea 2015) . Quantities for concentrates and roughage are not available in the FADN data and were estimated by dividing concentrate costs for ruminants and roughage costs by average prices (Schmid and Lanz 2013) . However, the data on concentrate costs in FADN also include expenses for the use of concentrates produced on-farm, which provides a sound basis for estimating the quantities of concentrate supplementation. Data on N surpluses are only available for a subsample of 62 dairy farms for the four-year period from 2011 to 2014. For those farms, data on N surpluses have been collected by the Central Evaluation of Agri-Environmental Indicators CEAEI (2017). Table 5 in Appendix A.1 shows summary statistics for the observation period 2011 to 2015.
Empirical model
We identify the causal short-run eects of the GMF program in a dierence-in-dierences (DiD) model, which compares participating and non-participating farms before (2011-2013) and after (2014-2015) the introduction of the program. Our baseline model is a regression formulation of the DiD model, and specied as follows: We are interested in the coecient δ on the variable GM F , which identies the average treatment eect on the treated (ATT) of participating in the GMF program (see Blundell and Costa Dias 2009, Lechner 2010) .
Long-run analysis: simulation model
We use the agent-based sector model SWISSland (Möhring et al. 2016 ) to project the long-run eects of the GMF program on the same outcomes discussed in the previous section: concentrate feed (percent), maize feed (percent), grass feed (percent), milk yield per cow (kg), ecological area (percent), income (CHF), and N surplus (kg/ha). SWISSland allows us to analyze the long-run eects of the GMF program at both farm and sector level.
The agent population of the model is based on 3,300 farms in the Swiss FADN database from 2011 to 2013. SWISSland projects farm and sector outcomes from 2014 to 2025. Agents' production decisions are determined by recursive-dynamic PMP-based farm-level optimization models (Möhring et al. 2016) . After solving the optimization models of all agents, we aggregate farm supply to aggregate supply at the sector level (Möhring et al. 2016 ). Then we link aggregate supply with a partial equilibrium demand model to compute market prices for each product. Product prices in the rst projection year provide agents' price expectations for the subsequent year (i.e., agents have adaptive expectations), which in turn determine their production decisions.
N surpluses are computed based on nitrogen farm gate balances implemented in the farm optimization models (Oenema et al. 2003) . The farm gate balance accounts for nitrogen input and output, which are both estimated based on the results of the optimization model (Möhring et al. 2016) . The N surplus measures the overall dierence between input and output. Nitrogen input on farm scale originates from purchased nitrogen, i.e., fertilizer, feed or animals, as well as from nitrogen xation and deposition. Nitrogen output accounts for the amount of nitrogen leaving the farm through sold agricultural products.
Predicting participation in the GMF program for a heterogeneous farm sample in the long run represents a challenge for an agent-based model like SWISSland. We estimate an agent's probability of participating in the GMF program based on a linear probability model (see Appendix A.2 for a detailed discussion). We assume that agents join the GMF program if the predicted probability is higher than 0.5. For those agents joining the GMF program and for whom the concentrate and maize limits are binding, we assume no further increase in milk yields. This assumption is based on the positive correlation of concentrate supplementation and milk yields observed in the data (Erdin and Giuliani 2011) . For those agents not participating in the GMF program, we assume an annual increase in the milk yield that reects the average growth trend over the last 15 years in Switzerland (Möhring et al. 2016) . As observed in the data, the increase in milk yield in the model goes hand in hand with an increase in concentrate feed, which is calculated based on farm planning data. We further assume an increase in crop yields along with higher mineral fertilizer input, and a decrease in labor demand due to (labor-saving) technological progress (Möhring et al. 2016 ).
Those agents participating in the GMF program but not fullling the program's feeding constraints must expand the quantity of grass at the expense of concentrate or maize supplementation. We include the most relevant farm strategy options in the optimization models: (i) reduction in concentrate supplementation in dairy production which needs to be substituted equally with high-quality grass, (ii) reduction in the number of ruminants per ha of grassland, (iii) increase in grassland area at the expense of arable land, (iv) intensication of grassland from one to more additional cuts per year, (v) purchase of grass or hay. However, substituting concentrates with grass cannot fully compensate the nutrient loss. We therefore assume a decrease in milk yield per cow. The milk yield reductions are calculated based on feed recommendations for Swiss farmers from Agroscope (2016), taking into account the level of milk yield and the amount of concentrate reduction.
If land use or livestock numbers change as a consequence of participating in the program, labor demand is also aected. In this case, non-family labor is adjusted in the optimization process. Family labor and land capacities, however, remain at their initial levels. All ecological obligations which Swiss farmers have to full in order to receive direct payments (nitrogen balance, requirement for 7 percent of ecological compensation areas and an upper limit on livestock densities per ha) are also taken into account.
Results and discussion
This section presents and discusses the results from the short-and long-run analysis. Table 5 in Appendix A.1). We see that farms participating in the GMF program are on average slightly smaller in terms of total farm area but have more grassland area. They have fewer ruminants, each producing less milk. Farms participating in the GMF program receive less direct payments, and are more often located in mountainous regions, and specialized in animal production. Farmers participating in the GMF program are more likely to have completed vocational education, and less likely to have further education. This shows that participating and non-participating farms were already dierent before entering the GMF program. This hints at selection issues.
[ Table 1 about here.]
To check if the two groups followed a common trend before the program's introduction, we look at the evolution of all outcomes over time for both groups. Figure 1 shows that, prior to introduction, all outcomes for participating and non-participating farms followed a common trend. Until 2013, all outcomes evolved very similarly for both groups. After 2013, most outcomes of farms participating in the program start to deviate from those of non-participating farms. We conclude that, although there are observable dierences in farm characteristics, all outcomes follow a similar trend for farms in both groups before the introduction of the program. This strengthens our condence in the assumption that there are no important dierences in unobserved factors between the two groups correlated with the decision to participate in the GMF program.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
Third, we discuss the results from estimating model (1) by OLS. Model (1) identies the ATT of the GMF program on a particular outcome. Columns in Table 2 show the results of model (1) for the following outcomes: concentrate feed (percent), maize feed (percent), grass feed (percent), milk yield per cow (kg), ecological area (percent), and income (CHF). We argue that, since both groups follow a common trend before the introduction of the program, there are no unobservable factors correlated with a farmer's decision to participate in the program. In other words, once we control for observable dierences, we have taken care of selection issues. To estimate the unbiased eect of the program, there should be no interaction between farms participating and not participating in the program (called the stable unit treatment value assumption or SUTVA). However, there may be spillovers through market interactions. Since our ex-ante analysis explicitly models such interactions, comparing the results of the ex-post with ex-ante analysis oers a way of assessing potential biases.
[ We see that the ATT of the GMF program on the proportion of concentrate feed is about 1 percentage point. The eect is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. It means that in the absence of the program the proportion of concentrate feed would have been almost 1 percentage point higher. We also see that the program has no eect on the proportion of maize feed, the proportion of ecological area, or the N surplus (kg/ha). All three coecients are very small (both in absolute terms and relative to their pre-treatment means), and statistically not signicant. However, the GMF program increases the proportion of grass feed by about 1 percentage point and income by approximately CHF 6,300, and decreases milk yield per cow by about 170 kg. All coecients are statistically signicant. We conclude that the GMF program has either no eect, or only very small eects, in the short run on environmental outcomes like ecological area and N surplus. However, the GMF program has an eect on economic outcomes like farm income (CHF 6,300 increase or almost 10 percentage points), and milk yield (170 kg/cow decrease or almost 3 percentage points) in the short run. Furthermore, the program substitutes grass feed at the expense of concentrate feed, i.e., concentrate feed increases by 0.9 percentage points whereas grass feed increases by 1 percentage point. This suggests a small but positive eect on food security.
Long-run analysis
In SWISSland, we compare the outcomes at farm and sectoral level in a scenario where the GMF program is in place with a reference scenario without the program (holding everything else constant). In other words, the scenario with the GMF program in place simulates the counterfactual. The dierence between the two scenarios identies the average treatment eects of the program.
Eects at farm level Table 3 below shows the average treatment eects at farm level on the various outcomes (columns) in 2015, 2020 and 2025 (rows) respectively. The rst panel shows the average treatment eect (ATE), the second panel the average treatment eects on the treated (ATT), and the third panel the average treatment eects on the untreated (ATU). The ATE measures the dierence in mean (average) outcomes of all farms in a state without the GMF program, and a counterfactual state with the GMF program in place. Similarly, the ATT (ATU) measures the dierence in mean outcomes of participating (nonparticipating) farms in a state without the program, and in a counterfactual state with the program. All simulation results can be found in Table 6 in Appendix A.2.
[ Table 3 about here.]
Our discussion of the long-run eects estimated by SWISSland focuses on the average treatment eects (ATE); the discussion for ATT is very similar. In 2015, the GMF program leads on average to a reduction in milk yield of about 60 kg per cow, a 1.7 percent reduction in the proportion of concentrate feed, and an increase in the proportion of grass feed. In the long run, the impact of the GMF program on milk yield and proportions of concentrate and maize feed is increasing: the milk yield in 2025 is approximately 400 kg less per cow, and the proportion of concentrate feed is 2.6 percentage points lower, whereas the proportion of grass feed is 2 percentage points higher, ceteris paribus. The intuition is the following. Because participating farms cannot realize milk yield increases due to concentrate restrictions, the gap in milk yields between participating and non-participating farms grows. The GMF program does not aect the proportion of maize feed either in the short or the long run. However, the GMF program has a positive eect on farm income in the long run, of approx. CHF 8,000. On the one hand, there is a direct eect on farm income through the payment received from the program (compensation for forgone revenue from milk sales due to lower milk yields). On the other hand, there are indirect eects on farm income through lower feed costs, and higher milk prices due to lower milk supply (see discussion below on equilibrium eects at sector level). Here, it is interesting to see that non-participating farms gain even more from higher milk prices as their milk yields continue to grow. The GMF program has a redistributive aspect, in the sense that it redistributes income generated from milk sales from participating to non-participating farms through its eect on milk prices. Finally, the program has a small long-run eect on the ecological area and the N surplus. On average, the ecological area remains almost unchanged whereas the N surplus is about 3 kg per ha lower in 2025. We conclude that the GMF program has no or only a very modest eect on environmental outcomes but more substantial eects on economic outcomes and food security in the long run.
Eects at sector level
One advantage of the analysis with SWISSland over the empirical analysis is that it allows us to assess the eects of the GMF program at sector level (see Table 4 below).
[ Table 4 about here.]
First, we see that the GMF program has a negative eect on farm exit. The intuition is that increasing farm incomes due to the GMF program lead to a lower exit rate since farm income is the main determinant of the exit rate (Möhring et al. 2015) . Even though the number of dairy cows increases slightly due to the GMF program, it does not oset the eect of lower milk yields on milk sales. This leads to an equilibrium with lower milk supply, and higher milk prices. In fact, milk prices are about 6 cents higher per kg in 2025, leading to higher revenues from milk sales (i.e., the price eect dominates the quantity eect). Finally, the GMF program increases intensively used grassland while having a slightly negative impact on extensively used grassland. The cap on maize in the GMF program has no eect on the maize area.
The GMF program has a small positive eect on the N surplus of the Swiss agricultural sector of about 2,000 tons. In the long run, the program's eect on the N surplus is almost constant even though the concentrate use in ruminant production is decreasing. The increase in intensively used grassland at the expense of extensively used grassland, which causes higher N input through xation and through mineral fertilizer, partially compensates the positive eects of concentrate savings. However, the decrease in N output due to lower milk yields also reduces the positive eects of the savings. Last, we see that the increase in farm income exceeds the budget outlay of the GMF program. This suggests a high transfer eciency, i.e., change in income due to the program in relation to the change in direct payments.
Existing ex-ante impact evaluations of direct payments for grassland without concentrate feed restrictions also show an extension of grassland area and dairy cows in Switzerland (Hecht et al. 2014 . However, these studies show that direct payments for grassland lead to an increase in milk supply with negative eects on milk prices, whereas no eect on the amount of concentrates used in ruminant production was found.
Discussion of short-vs. long-run results
For a better understanding and interpretation of our results, we compare ex-post and ex-ante results in detail. Remember, Table 2 shows the average treatment eects on the treated (ATT) for various outcomes. In Table 3 , the second panel shows the ATT for all considered outcomes. We compare the rst line labeled GMF 15 of the middle panel in Table 3 with GMF in Table 2 . Overall, the empirical and the simulation model draw very similar conclusions about the eect of the GMF program on the farms participating in the program.
Taking a closer look, we see that simulation results show larger eects on the proportion of concentrate feed and grass feed (twice the size of the eect in the empirical analysis), whereas they show a somewhat smaller eect on milk yield (80 kg per cow less) and larger eect on income (CHF 1,000 more). Both models essentially nd no short-run eect of the GMF program on ecological area (while they agree about the negligible size of the eect, they disagree on the sign). However, the eects on maize feed and N surplus are very similar.
Dierences are explained by dierent assumptions of ex-ante and ex-post models. For example, the dierence in the eects on concentrate feed can be explained by assumptions in SWISSland about noncompliance on the one hand, and milk yield increase on the other hand. First, in SWISSland, all farms participating in the program are assumed to always comply with all feeding restrictions. However, we know that, in reality, non-compliance occurs if farmers suspect that monitoring of a program is dicult for the government (Ferraro 2008) . From interviews with program inspectors, we know that inspections of concentrate use for ruminants are dicult to conduct, such that non-compliance might occur. These assumptions imply that SWISSland may tend to overestimate the eects on concentrate use in the long run. Second, milk yields per cow are assumed to increase at a constant rate in SWISSland (based on long-run milk yield trends) whereas, in reality, milk yields uctuate from year to year.
Both models nd that the GMF program has very small eects on environmental outcomes in the short and long run. In both the short and long run, the changes in ecological area and the N surplus are negligible (and not statistically signicant). Since there is no eect on the proportion of ecological area, we do not expect positive eects on biodiversity. However, because the GMF program reduces concentrate use in ruminant production (not only total concentrate use but also concentrate use per kg of milk), as well as concentrate imports, it potentially contributes to food security. Furthermore, since there is a small positive eect on the proportion of grassland area, there might be positive eects on ecosystem services such as carbon sequestration and soil protection.
However, both models nd signicant eects on economic outcomes like farm income and milk yield per cow. Lower milk yields per cow imply better animal health in the long run (Rauw et al. 1998, Oltenacu and Broom 2010) . Several studies show a negative correlation between high milk performance per cow and health risks, e.g., lameness, mastitis, metritis, or fertility dysfunctions (Ingvartsen et al. 2003 , Lopez et al. 2004 , Archer et al. 2010 , de Vries et al. 2014 ). Incomes of both participating and non-participating farms increase through eects of milk prices due to a lower milk supply (i.e., lower milk yields) in equilibrium. However, spillover eects of the GMF program on non-participating farms (control group) through market interactions (i.e., through milk prices) are a potential problem for the DiD analysis. If spillover eects are present in reality, the DiD model might yield biased estimates. Since SWISSland accounts for such interactions, our ex-ante analysis oers a way to gauge potential bias. We note that the DiD model may underestimate the eect of the GMF program on farm income. However, our analysis suggests that if there are any biases, they are rather small.
In sum, both approaches, although very dierent in terms of methodology, give very similar results in terms of sign and order of magnitude of the short-run eects. In other words, both empirical and simulation models yield short-run eects that are in the same ballpark. Furthermore, the discussion above on spillover eects highlights an important contribution of our paper. By combining ex-ante and ex-post analysis, we are able to shed more light on potential violations of our models' assumptions. Altogether, this makes us more condent in our results.
Conclusion
This paper combines ex-post and ex-ante methods to evaluate an agri-environmental program in Switzerland. It allows us to combine evidence for causal short-run eects with predictions of long-run eects. This has the advantage that policy instruments can be evaluated soon after their introduction, allowing policy makers to adjust policy instruments more promptly.
We nd that the GMF program meets most of its political goals, but not all. While the program improves the competitiveness of Swiss dairy farmers and contributes positively to food security, its eects on environmental outcomes like N surplus are modest at best. However, if the main goals of the policy are to support farmers' incomes or to contribute to food security, this is a good way to do so since the policy has no negative eects on the environment. But if the main goal is to improve environmental outcomes, our analysis shows that this is not an eective policy.
For Switzerland, the program might prevent future increases in concentrate supplementation in dairy production if taris on fodder concentrates are reduced in upcoming trade liberalizations (Mack et al. 2009 ). The impact of the program on maize feed should be improved by adjusting maize feeding restrictions in the lowland regions of Switzerland. Because concentrate feeding restrictions have a dampening eect on milk supply due to lower milk yields per cow or reductions in the number of dairy cows even when milk prices are rising, the program may lower milk price volatility. We believe that further research in this direction is promising. Table 6 below shows the data in levels from the simulation runs with SWISSland.
[ Table 6 about here.]
We estimate the probability of a farm participating in the GMF program based on FADN data (Hoop and Schmid 2014) . In particular, we estimate the following linear probability model with OLS
where the vector xi,pre includes the following covariates (varying at the farm level): concentrate feed (percent), maize feed (percent), milk yield per cow (kg), ruminants (livestock unit), cow density (cows/ha), cows with high concentrate intake (percent), age, crop area (ha), as well as a constant. All independent variables are averages computed for the pre-treatment period 2011 to 2013, whereas the dependent variable GM Fi,post refers to whether farm i participates in the GMF program in the post-treatment period 2014 and 2015. Altogether, we have observations for 740 farms.
Here, it is important to see the conceptual dierence between the DiD model (1) and the LP model (2). The DiD model (1) estimates the causal eect of the GMF on various outcomes by comparing participating and non-participating farms before and after the introduction of the program. The LP model (2) predicts whether a particular farm participates in the program after its introduction, based on farm characteristics observed before the program's introduction. Hence, there is no identication problem (i.e., simultaneity) in the causal model since future participation in the program has no eect on past outcomes (characteristics). However, since participation in the LP model (2) depends on lagged outcomes, we need to control for those outcomes in the DiD model (1), see also the discussion on selection issues in Section 4.1.
The linear probability model represents a simple way to integrate the estimated probability of participation in the GMF program into SWISSland. Of course, we are well aware of the shortcomings of using a linear probability model, like heteroskedasticity of the error term and predictions outside the (0, 1) interval (Winkelmann and Boes 2009) . We address the issue of heteroskedastic errors by computing robust standard errors. The issue of predictions outside the (0, 1) interval is a potential problem. However, we only use the information whether the predicted probability is below 50 percent (non-participation) or above 50 percent (participation). Thus, predictions outside the (0, 1) interval are either set to zero for predictions below zero, or to one for predictions above 1. Table 7 below shows the results from the linear probability model (LPM), as well as marginal eects from Probit and Logit models evaluated at the mean. We see that the estimated marginal eects are very similar for the LPM, Probit and Logit models.
[ Table 7 about here.]
We are especially worried about cases where the LPM predicts a probability above 0.5 whereas the Probit (and Logit) model predicts a probability below 0.5, and vice versa. Figure 2 depicts predicted probabilities in our sample for both LPM (x-axis) and Probit model (y-axis).
[ Clustered standard errors in parentheses (at farm level) * p < 0.1, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01
Notes: ATT is short for average treatment eect on the treated. The row mean refers to the mean of the dependent variables for the pre-treatment period 2011-2013. All models control for age, education, farm type, total direct payments, total area, number of ruminants, and milk prices.
Sources: FADN (Hoop and Schmid 2014) and CEAEI (2017) Sources: FADN (Hoop and Schmid 2014) and CEAEI (2017) 
